Agency theory, information, and incentives

Wolfgang Ballwieser, BambergGünter, Klaus Spremann, 著ほか

This book deals with a wide range of topics in agency theory. Agency theory focuses on information and on incentives, with basic approaches from microeconomics and risk analysis. Among the broad variety of applications are the different organizational patterns of cooperation in institutions and the various aspects of the separation of ownership and control which are fundamental for the modern field of business finance. The topics selected form the eight sections of the book: 1) Agency Theory and Risk Sharing 2) Information and Incentives 3) Capital Markets and Moral Hazard 4) Financial Contracting and Dividends 5) External Accounting and Auditing 6) Coordination in Groups 7) Property Rights and Fairness 8) Agency Costs

出版社

Springer-Verlag

発売日

1989-01-01

ISBN

9783540516750